MAIN RESULTS THE YEAR 2015
І. Overviews of political events of the week
MAIN RESULTS OF REFORMS AND CHALLENGES TO POLITICA
DOMESTIC DIMENSIONS OF THE MINSK PROCESS
UKRAINE-EU: POINT OF NO RETURN ON THE PATH TO EURO-INTEGRATION
The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) conducted an anti-diversion operation in the city of Avdiyivka (Donetsk oblast) as a result of which nearly 100 individuals were detained. The SBU informed that soldiers of the Donetsk People’s Republic orchestrated the terrorist act in Avdiyivka under the guise of the Ukrainian army.
On January 31, 2016 Russia will impose a customs and product embargo against Ukraine in response to anti-Russian sanctions, the head of the Russian government Dmitry Medvedev stated. In its turn, the Council of Europe approved the decision to extend the economic sanctions against Russia in connection with the situation in Ukraine for six months.
December |
Ukraine and Israel plan to sign an agreement on a free trade zone in the first half of 2016, President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko informed, based on the results of talks with the leadership of Israel during his recent visit to that country.
Soldiers of the DPR seized the village of Kominternove located not far from Mariupol. A subdivision of illegal armed formations of nearly 100 soldiers raided the village, the press service of the Anti-terrorist Operation (ATO) informed.
Residents of Kryviy Rih held a demonstration in front of the Verkhovna Rada in Kyiv. They demanded from the parliamentarians to put on the daily agenda the issue of re-election of the mayor of Kryiviy Rih. The majority of deputies voted in favor of postponing this issue to December 23.
December |
The Verkhovna Rada set the elections in Kryviy Rih for March 27, 2016.
The Anti-corruption Forum opened in Kyiv at which more than 6,000 participants gathered. Among them were politicians, civil activists, experts and journalists. Head of the Odesa Oblast State Administration Mikheil Saakashvili and several organizations among which were Avtomaidan, the Maidan Open University, the Chesno (Honesty) movement, the Democratic Alliance party and others attended the forum. Organizers of the forum said its main goal is “to concentrate the forces of society on the fight against corruption in all spheres of the economy”. President Petro Poroshenko sent a letter of welcome to the West.
December |
VR deputies approved amendments to the Tax Code that were imperative for the adoption of the 2016 National Budget. In particular, the amount of the single social contribution (SSC) is set at 22%.
The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine passed the law on increasing guarantees of complicance with therights and freedoms of internally displaced individuals taking into account the proposals of the president of Ukraine. This law simplifies the process of counting the number of displaced people.
The Russian terrorist army fired against forces of the ATO 51 times over the past day. It fired grenades, high-caliber machine guns and rifles.
Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine Arseniy Avakov called for immediately convening the National Security and Defense Council in connection with the aggravation of the military situation in the eastern part of Ukraine. The head of the MIA informed that terrorist armies of the self-proclaimed DPR occupied another two settlements near Mariupol in the Donetsk oblast.
Head of the Odesa Oblast State Administration Mikheil Saakashvili stated that the Ukrainian government together with the leadership of the Prosecutor General’s Office should be dismissed and new people should replace them. He made this statement during his address at the Anti-corruption Forum.
The main terrorist forces of the so-called DPR withdrew from the village of Kominterne, though a part of the soldiers dressed into plain clothes and hid in buildings of local residents, Press Secretary of the Presidential Administration on ATO Issues Andriy Lysenko informed.
December |
The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the bill of the 2016 National Budget on the eve of December 25, 2015. 263 people’s deputies supported the bill. The Batkivshchyna and Samopomich factions abstained from voting in favor of the budget. The revenues of the National Budget are UAH 595.1 bn and expenditures are UAH 684.5 bn. According to calculations of the Ministry of Finance, inflation is projected at 12%.
Minister of Finance of Ukraine Natalia Jaresko stated that the IMF mission will review the balance of the Ukrainian budget for 2016, she wrote on her Facebook page.
Agents of the Prosecutor General’s Office conducted a search of the home of the leader of the UKROP party Hennadiy Korban in Dnipropetrovsk. After that they transported the politician to Kyiv in an ambulance for emergency medical examination. On the road the politician’s condition became worse.
At the same time, a new precautionary measure was imposed against the election of the leader of the UKROP party was reviewed in the Dniprovsk District Court of Kyiv – namely, his detention. The court session was held without the defendant’s participation and the presence of his defense lawyers. Meanwhile, doctors at the Amosov hospital in Kyiv ran a coronary angiography of Korban’s blood vessels.
December |
President Petro Poroshenko signed the law on expansion of powers of local bodies of self-government and optimization of the granting of administrative services. According to this law the bodies of executive power and local self-government will be granted additional powers. This, in turn, will fundamentally change and optimize the procedure of granting of administrative services.
MAIN RESULTS THE YEAR 2015
MAIN RESULTS OF REFORMS AND CHALLENGES TO POLITICAL STABILITY
Oleksiy Sydorchuk
In 2015 Ukraine was once again forced to face several challenges. The military actions in the Donbas region continued and were periodically aggravated. The economic situation in the country remained extremely complicated. In these conditions the Ukrainian leadership was supposed to fulfill its promises and bring reforms in different spheres of social life to fruition and at the same time preserve internal unity. The powerful support of western countries and organizations and the active promotion of representatives of Ukrainian civil society were intended to help Ukraine pull out of this political and economic quagmire.
Limited reforms
The sluggish progress of reforms over the course of 2014 evoked great expectations among Ukrainians who hoped that this process would be accelerated in 2015. As time showed, the reform efforts of the Ukrainian leadership over the year were ambiguous and unevenly distributed between different spheres of social life.
Clearly, success in the sphere of decentralization was the most notable. Over the course of the year the provisions of budget and fiscal decentralization were effective as a result of which the revenues of local budgets significantly increased and the bodies of local self-government were stimulated to improve the investment climate in their own territories. Thanks to the law on voluntary unification of territorial communities that was approved in February, 800 communities formed 159 united communities that were able to elect their representatives at the local elections held in October and were granted expanded authority and financial resources. The process of enlargement of communities lasted to the end of the year.
In order to continue decentralization reform representatives of the Constitutional Committee drafted a bill on amendments to the Constitution that envisages the transfer of executive powers at the regional level from state administrations to local councils and introduction of a new control institution known as prefects. Overall, the bill on constitutional amendments has great potential for deepening decentralization reforms, though much will depend on further legislative changes. The Verkhovna Rada voted for of the bill in its first reading in August, though the acute political opposition to the bill forced its initiators to defer its second reading to the start of 2016.
In other key spheres the progress of reforms was less obvious. In particular, the Ukrainian leadership managed to achieve a certain measure of success in the fight against corruption, though the entire process was too sluggish and controversial. Although by the end of the year two key anti-corruption bodies were created – the National Anti-corruption Bureau and the Specialized Anti-corruption Prosecutor’s Office – despite the attempts of pro-presidential forces and the Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin to block this process, in 2015 these bodies only functioned for a month. The third key institution – the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption – was never formed in its full capacity, first and foremost due to the counteraction of the Cabinet of Ministers.
The adoption of two important laws can be notched in this sphere. First of all, the parliament adopted a new law on the civil service, which envisages greater independence and better financial terms for civil servants and at the same time establishes stringent anti-corruption control over their activity. In addition to that, the new law has critical significance for the overall reform of public administration, which has been left on the sidelines after the Dignity Revolution, due to the introduction of open tenders in the selection of civil servants and the system of evaluation of their achievements. Despite this, its success depends to a large degree on the ability of the government to raise enough funds in order to increase salaries of civil servants that are currently miserably low.
Another important law pertains to the financing of political parties, which grants state subsidies to political parties that hurdled the 5% threshold (in the future – 2%), sets detailed requirements regarding financial reporting of parties and envisages strict control over compliance with the new norms. The effective implementation of the new law could in the future reduce the dependence of parties on oligarchs and non-transparent financing, though two factors will to a great degree influence these prospects: reform in contiguous spheres (in particular, the limitation of political advertisement) and assistance of new controlling bodies on the part of representatives of civil society.
Certain progress was notable in the sphere of law enforcement bodies. The pilot projects of patrol police, which replaced the State Automobile Inspection in several cities across Ukraine, have in general been quite successful and demonstrated the new quality of protection of public order. At the same time, full-fledged reform of the law enforcement system has yet to be implemented. The law on the national police system adopted in July of this year left it under the direct control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which casts doubt on the possibility of radical revamping of law enforcement structures. The process of selection of new police officers has already come up against certain problems associated with the political dependence of members of attestation committees, though final results will be seen only next year.
Meanwhile, the judicial system in Ukraine did not undergo any changes over this year. The Constitutional Committee managed to draft a bill on amendments to the Constitution related to the system of justice, which received a positive response from the Venice Commission, though Ukraine’s parliament has not yet begun its consideration. The process of re-attestation of judges did not produce any tangible results, while the courts continued to demonstrate their dependence on political bodies and their vulnerability to corruption. In particular, over the year not a single official was convicted for acts of corruption.
The Prosecutor General’s Office did not undergo reform: the new specialized law did not lead to any fundamental changes in its activities, which was dictated by political expediency. Meanwhile, the investigation of socially resonant events such as the shooting of demonstrators during the Dignity Revolution or the tragic events in Odesa in May 2014 hardly moved from a dead end.
Among other failures of reform efforts of the Ukrainian leadership was the new law on local elections. Regardless of the promises and obligations to introduce a proportional system with “open lists” fixed in the coalition agreement, the parliamentary majority supported the model allowing party leaders to retain their control over candidates and distorting the representation of the electorate in local councils. Moreover, no steps were taken to improve the parliamentary electoral model or harmonization of the specialized legislation into a single electoral code.
Insidious unity
2015 was also the year of testing the strength of the new coalition in power. The two key actors – President Petro Poroshenko and Premier Arseniy Yatsenyuk – managed to maintain quite high level of cooperation, despite the fact that representatives of their inner circles conflicted with one another on a number of occasions. Besides that, the president and premier managed to coordinate a fairly effective system of division of powers between one another: the first concentrated his efforts on foreign and defense policy, while the second focused on domestic issues.
At the same time, over a year a whole series of conflicts erupted between representatives of different groups of influence among the ruling elite that had an impact on the stability of the ruling coalition. In particular, the contours of the conflict of the president and his milieu with the team of Dnipropetrovsk oligarch Ihor Kolomoiskiy, who had influence on a group of deputies in different parliamentary factions, became glaringly obvious. And although several deputies that were proponents of Kolomoiskiy ended up leaving the coalition, this did not have sufficient impact on the activity of the latter. The conflict was dragged out to the end of the year and led to the formation of a conglomerate of political forces inside and outside the parliament in opposition to Poroshenko.
Another conflict directly startled the coalition. Its apogee was the voting for constitutional amendments regarding decentralization in August during which four law enforcement officers died under the walls of the parliament and after which the Radical Party led by Oleh Lyashko deserted from the coalition. Clearly, such a move was dictated by the upcoming local elections and after they were wrapped up Lyashko’s party continued to vote according to the position of the Petro Poroshenko Bloc. At the same time, the voting was testimony to the existence of an internal opposition in the coalition – the Samopomich and Batkivshchyna parties, which further objected to key initiatives of the president on more than one occasion.
Premier Arseniy Yatsenyuk also ended up in the epicenter of periodical conflicts. Deputies of other parties repeadetly accused him of disastrous socio-economic policy. Despite this, talks of his dismissal by the end of the year did not materialize. On the other hand, Head of the Odesa State Oblast Administration and ex-president of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili, who actively criticized the premier and accused him of corruption, became a new rival of Yatsenyuk upon the behest of President Poroshenko. It cannot be ruled out that next year Saakashvili will form his own political force and will contend for the post of the head of government.
Despite this, all the centrifugal trends in 2015 did not lead to the collapse or paralysis of the ruling coalition. It is quite clear that the main reason for this was the existence of two threatening external factors – Russia’s aggression and the complicated economic situation – which spurred the key political actors to preserve a tactical alliance fearing the negative consequences for all of them in the event that it is violated. Besides that, western states and international organizations that conditioned the continuation of financial support of the Ukrainian leadership upon preservation of cooperation inside the coalition also had a positive effect on the unity of the ruling power.
Conclusions
As such, over 2015 the Ukrainian leadership managed to achieve notable progress in certain spheres, in particular decentralization, and lay the groundwork for positive steps in other spheres, first and foremost reforms of the civil service and the financing of political parties. The achievements in the reform of other important sectors – namely, law enforcement and the judicial system and the fight against corruption – were, on the contrary, far from anticipated.
Here the representatives of the ruling power managed to preserve relative unity on the backdrop of several conflicts between them. However, the contradictions inside the coalition pose the risk of an upheaval of stability in the country if external negative and positive factors weaken their mobilizing influence.
DOMESTIC DIMENSIONS OF THE MINSK PROCESS
Olexiy Haran,
Andriy Sukharyna
The term “Ukrainian crisis” - much used by the international media - is not really correct. The Ukrainian domestic crisis ended with President Yanukovych’s escape to Russia, the return to the 2004 constitutional reform which prevents a monopoly of power, and the smooth legitimization of the new Ukrainian authorities. And this is one of the key reasons that President Putin decided to intervene. Otherwise, there would have been no “Russian spring” in the Crimea or Donbas. With the start of the«hybrid war», Russia followed the same path as in Moldova and Georgia.
However, the polls from April 2014 confirmed that there was not much support for separatism in the south and east of Ukraine with the exception of the Donbas (and even there supporters of separatism were in the minority). As it failed to split Ukraine, Moscow decided to impose its ‘federalisation plan’. However, even in Donbas polls clearly showed that a majority favoured decentralisation, rather than federalisation.[1] The difference is that decentralisation’s basic level is the communal one while Russia’s ‘federalisation’ (without self-government at the basic level) could only lead to the ‘feudalisation’ of Ukraine.
Russia’s aggression has contributed to this dramatic shift in Ukrainian society over the past year. Polls in areas of Donbas under Ukrainian control show that when confronted with the alternative, most would choose not a regional but an all-Ukrainian identity. No more than 3 percent would recognise separation of ‘LNR’ and ‘DNR’ from Ukraine.[2]
Recent local elections on 25 October were the first competitive elections for almost 20 years in the Donbas. The Opposition Bloc - which is based on the remnants of Yanukovych’s Party of Regions – did well in many places in Donbas. However, its results were lower than in 2010 and so it lost its monopoly on power in the Donbas.
- Domestic reactions to Minsk
Minsk-1, signed in early September 2014, looked promising. In the Ukrainian parliament there was a tense debate over President Poroshenko’s law on ‘peculiarities of self-government’ for parts of the Donbas, but the bill was approved by 277 votes out of 450. However, in reality the ceasefire never came into force. Moreover, Russia’s proхies increased the territory under their control.
Minsk-2, signed in February 2015, was immediately violated by Russia. Despite the proclaimed ceasefire, Russian troops continued attacks for four days and seized the strategic town of Debaltsevo.
With the Minsk Agreement, Western powers not only imposed constitutional changes on Ukraine, but Poroshenko himself went beyond his authority in agreeing to change the Constitution. Trying to secure support in the Rada he included in one package not only a decentralisation plan for the whole of Ukraine (which is basically supported in Ukraine), but also a special status for the occupied areas. This step was strongly opposed by three members of the ruling coalition (Samopomich or “Self-Reliance”, Yulia Tymoshenko’s Batkivshchyna and populist Radical party) plus some MPs from Poroshenko’s Bloc and prime minister’s People’s Front.
Still, these changes were approved on 31 August 2015 by 264 votes. This can be explained by the trick of having different changes in “one basket”, strong pressure from the West, and fear that Kyiv was in danger of losing Western support. Finally, Poroshenko’s draft law got unanimous support from the Opposition Bloc which damaged his image. This vote led to clashes in front of parliament and the death of of four soldiers of the National Guard because of grenade thrown by one of protesters.
It will be difficult for Poroshenko to collect the 300 votes (out of 450) needed for the second reading of the constitutional changes, perhaps only support of the Opposition Bloc which will make him come across as a ‘traitor of Maidan ideals’.
What are the arguments against a constitutional special status (even on temporary basis) for the occupied areas?
- Russia plans for the “Bosnianisation” of Ukraine. To achieve it Kremlin may try to use clause 11 of the Minsk-2 accords. In contrast to the constitutional unitary status of Ukraine, it is designed to give autonomy to areas controlled by Russia’s proxies and make Ukraine and the West pay for the reconstruction of destroyed Donbas economy. It looks like a reward for the Kremlin for its aggression.
- Mistrust of the West which has not fulfilled its promises. The format of consultations with the US, the UK and Russia in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum was never implemented. The “Geneva format” (Ukraine, Russia, the US, the EU) has ceased to exist. The return of Debaltsevo to Ukraine is not even under discussion.
- Trying to avoid a new escalation of war and “appeasing” Russia, Western partners have pressed Ukraine to implement constitutional changes, ahead of implementing the ceasefire and ahead of implementing the other clauses. The ceasifire (clause 1) proclaimed in September 2014 in reality came into force only last September and lasted only for two months. Also, Kyiv stresses that there can be dialogue only with those representatives of the occupied areas which are legitimately elected under Ukrainian law, OSCE monitoring and in compliance with OSCE standards (as stressed in Minsk-2 accords).
2. Elections in the occupied areas “under Ukrainian law”?
It is difficult to imagine free and fair elections on the territory controlled by Russian security services and armed half-criminal units.Who will have the right to vote? More than one million pro-Ukraine voters have left the Donbas, but they need to have the right to vote. Who will be able to run? Those who were killing, torturing, and kidnapping Ukrainian citizens? Should they be allowed to stand for election? Who will provide security at the polling stations? Ukrainian police or armed separatists? Will Ukrainian parties and mass media be able to function freely?
But there are two main issues that remain unsolved:
- Kyiv’s control over the Ukrainian-Russian border has not been restored. Unfortunately, according to Minsk-2 this should happen at the end of the peace process. Kyiv asked the EU to consider deploying an EU mission on the border but there has been no response yet;
- There has been no withdrawal of Russian troops, mercenaries, illegal armed formations, or Russian military equipment (as required by clause 10 of Minsk-2).
Without the demilitarisation of the region, it is difficult to imagine free elections. The OSCE does not have capacity to monitor the whole region. Some observers believe that the West is going just to tick the box to obtain a pretext for reducing or lifting sanctions on Russia. By having formal elections, Russia would like to create a camouflage for presenting Russian-Ukrainian conflict as the internal problem of Ukraine and involve Kyiv into direct dialogue with Russia’s proxies.
These concerns are shared not only by political opponents of President Poroshenko but also by the expert community in Ukraine. However, if a compromise can be reached in the trilateral Minsk Group, Poroshenko will be able to collect enough votes (only 226 out of 450) to get the special election law passed. His idea was to proceed after elections to restoring Ukraine’s border control and involving former separatists into the formal structures under control of Ukrainian state. By doing that he may be presenting himself as peacemaker for domestic consumption, but this long and controversial approach could also erode his support and thus risk further destabilisation.
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For more on implementation of Minsk agreements, see the report,
[1] See, Zerkalo Nedeli, April 19, 2014, p. 6, http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/yugo-vostok-vetv-dreva-nashego-_.html (in Russian).
[2] See, http://www.dif.org.ua/en/publications/press-relizy/press-ress2015.htm (in English).
UKRAINE-EU: POINT OF NO RETURN ON THE PATH TO EURO-INTEGRATION
Maria Zolkina
In 2015 the bilateral relations between Ukraine and the European Union finally took on a qualitative form. At the present stage the EU has the most actively become engaged in the domestic processes in Ukraine and in the international regulation of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in the history of bilateral relations. As a result, the daily agenda for Ukraine and the European Union on the whole factors in mutual political interests.
Bilateral relations: closer than ever
From the strategic vantage point, relations between Ukraine and the EU have undergone and continue to go through significant changes. Indeed, in 2015 Euro-integration transformed from a foreign policy priority to domestic reforms. Basically, it became an all-encompassing domestic state policy that touches on all key spheres of public administration.
In this way, the transformational capacity of the EU is being realized, but in this case it has an exceptional meaning and specific features for both Ukraine and the EU. In particular, the specifics in the case of Ukraine are in the fact that officially the country is not a candidate for membership in the EU and will not likely see prospects of being granted such membership in the foreseeable future.
At the same time, the Association Agreement, the political part of which is already provisionally being applied, is an unprecedented international agreement for both sides. The process of ratification of the Agreement in EU member countries was quite fast for EU standards. Even Greece, which for a long time did not initiate the procedure of ratification in principle, in November its parliament finally approved the Agreement.
Despite this, a challenge in the form of a referendum arose in The Netherlands. And though this referendum will apply more to the assessments of domestic and foreign policy of the EU than the latter’s relations with Ukraine, this challenge is critical for Ukraine and at the same time problematic. Indeed, it will require the corresponding informational and diplomatic efforts in order that the support of the harmonization with Ukraine will be acceptable not only for the political elite of EU member countries, but also does not incite resistance in society to members of the EU. This direction of work for Ukraine will be one of the main ones in 2016 on the terrain of the EU. The taking effect of the Association Agreement is particular in the fact that almost all of 2015 was a battle in the Russia-Ukraine-EU triangle, where Russia did everything possible to have influence on the content or procedure of application of the Association Agreement, particular as it applies to the economic part of the document. Let us recall that to a great degree the provisional application of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) between Ukraine and the EU was deferred to January 1, 2016 due to pressure applied by the Russian side.
Up until the end of 2015, 13 meetings were held in the trilateral format of the EU, Ukraine and Russia dedicated to the prospects of opening economic borders of the EU for Ukraine. Despite all the efforts of Russia to defer the implementation of the introduction of the DCFTA, the mutual achievements of Ukraine and the EU, the fact is that on January 1, 2016 as pre-planned will be realized. In this context, the most important factor is that the political pressure and the de facto blackmail via the economic embargo on Ukrainian products imposed by Russia did not disunite the tandem of Ukraine and its European partners on the negotiating front, rather quite to contrary actually reinforced it.
Similarly, the position of Russia was defined by the European Union as destructive. As such, the Association Agreement is heading towards the finish line and EU member countries and its institutions will forthwith put up a challenge to Ukraine to overcome the referendum in The Netherlands: the political consensus regarding the Association Agreement which has already been achieved at the level of parliamentarians and the heads of state of 28 EU member countries is worth trying to prevent negative results of voting in the referendum in Holland, even if it has some consultative significance.
The issue of broader formats of EU foreign policy under which Ukraine falls deserves separate attention. In particular, the issue is about European Neighborhood Policy and, more specifically, the Eastern Partnership Initiative. Indeed, the year 2015 can also be considered important from the vantage point that the review of the policy of the European Union has become more poignant like never before.
The corresponding inquiry and the needs associated first and foremost with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, which signed the Association Agreement, and unlike their forced partners in the Eastern Partnership clearly paved the road to joining the EU. It is precisely these three countries that de facto have become new potential core of European Partnership and they insist on the differentiation of policy of EU neighborhood in Eastern Europe before and after the Riga Summit in May 2015.
Outlining these differentiations in 2015 in practical terms was unsuccessful. As it turned out, changing the format of Eastern Partnership or the entire EU Neighborhood Policy was not possible, though the principle agreement that certain countries can count on a specific and individual approach of the EU, given the “ambitions, needs and pace of reform” (Clause 6 of the Final Declaration of the Results of the Riga Summit) is testimony to the fact that the EU will be forced to respond to the challenges of time. In other words, the bilateral dimension of relations with the EU remains for Ukraine will predominate over multilateral relations in 2016.
At the same time, one can predict that this bilateral level of relations, particularly as they pertain to Ukraine and the EU, will have an impact on changes to broader formats and policy of the European Union, which will induce the EU to adopt political and institutional decisions, in particular practical differentiation within the confines of the Eastern Partnership.
As such, the political history of the relations between Ukraine and the EU in 2015 became, first of all, a reflection of how the practical enhancement of mutual relations can preclude the existing institutional formats and, second of all, how the European Union took on the role of a full-fledged agent of internal changes in a country that formally remains a neighboring state.
In the end, it appears that the principle of conditionality in Ukraine works, though not in the classic sense of the term: the Ukrainian side is conducting internal reforms as a pre-condition of the Association Agreement in exchange for which it de-facto receives a) macro-financial, economic and expert support of the process of reform in and of itself (an illustrious example is reform of the civil service and decentralization) and b) political and diplomatic support on the international arena, in particular regarding the pressure on Russia, the execution of the Minsk agreements and regulation of the conflict in the East of Ukraine.
Thirdly, the relations with Ukraine became one of the most important and powerful driving forces of changes and the review of EU policy in general. While so far there have been no cardinal changes, Russian aggression in 2015 became a litmus test for the EU concerning its accord and the ability to approve consensual decisions as a unified actor in foreign policy. At the moment, these changes are less visible, but they will have an impact on the review of the priorities of the EU in the mid- and long-term future.
Visa-free dialog: a done deal?
Without a doubt an important component of the relations between Ukraine and the EU in 2015 was the implementation of the plan of action for visa liberalization, which was finally completed in December of this year with a positive conclusion of the European Commission regarding Ukraine’s readiness for introduction of a visa-free regime. In connection with this issue, it is worthwhile to place several accents.
First of all, the visa-free dialog is the most brilliant example of conducting concrete changes under the influence of integration relations with the EU. Indeed, the corresponding obligations in the plan of action on visa liberalization were a lever of influence on politicians and government officials in order that a whole series of long-awaited innovations would be approved. The most resonant of them was the formation of the Anti-corruption Bureau and its procedural satellite – the Special Anti-corruption Prosecutor’s Office, the law on the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption in order to review the financial decency of high-standing officials and the process of its formation, the approval of the law on the reform of the civil service, etc. And although the process of adopting the law and forming the institution was put under pressure by the resistance of certain players on the scene and even the conflict between different departments (the Prosecutor General’s Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), as a result the role of the visa-free plan as a bilateral document was fundamental. Thanks to this plan the motivation of political forces would have been minimal if such obligations were not in effect.
Secondly, the decision of the European Commission to positively assess the progress of Ukraine contains no additional conditions, but this decision is after all said and done is de facto a political forward or a compromise between reality and political expediency. Indeed, although Ukraine practically did all of its “homework”, some of it must be “corrected”. For example, over the first months of 2016 Ukraine must fully put into action the work of the Anti-corruption Bureau, the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption and approve in the second reading the Labor Code with an anti-discrimination norm. In other words, it must show not only that the institution was formed, but also put its work into action. In the end this means that at this stage the European Union was simply unable to not draw a positive conclusion of Ukraine’s progress.
A positive decision had to be made from the political and strategic vantage point, meaning that the promises of the government and the president that these goals will not be achieved prior to the review of the conclusions of the European Commission in the Council of European Union could not be left outside the brackets. This like nothing else points, first of all, to the high level of the strategic interest of the EU to expand relations with Ukraine. It would be much less beneficial for the European Union to drag out the scrupulous bureaucratic procrastination and the expert assessment of the visa-free process than giving a positive conclusion with such unofficial “warning”. From this point forward, the process totally depends on the Ukrainian side. In other words, the non-fulfillment of these requirements will absolutely be the fault of the Ukrainian leadership, while speculations that “the EU is being unfair” will be impossible.
Thirdly, from a strategic viewpoint this decision is critical for the support of the people’s trust in the European Union and the level of positive assessments of the Euro-integration in the future. This is extremely important at a time when yesterday’s proponents of a Customs Union became disenchanted with this option, but instead are transitioning either to the category of uncertain or those who believe that Ukraine should not integrate into the EU or the Customs Union (i.e. the Eurasian Economic Union). The public support of the idea of harmonization with the EU will to a great degree depend on the practical advantages of Euro-integration for the average citizen.
Russian aggression against Ukraine: reservation of unity on the part of the EU
The political and diplomatic support of Ukraine by the EU in the light of Russian aggression and the need to apply the corresponding international pressure on Russia was one of the main themes in the relations of Ukraine with the EU on the whole, and with certain members of the union, in particular. For this very reason one of the key features in the year 2015 was direct engagement of the EU, at least on the level of member states, to regulating the conflict in the Donbas. In this context, let’s take a look in greater detail into the concrete results and prognostications.
The sanctions of the European Union against Russia remain in force. Nevertheless, the latest decision on extending the sanctions approved in December 2015 turned out to be somehow more problematic than the previous decisions. Given this, the sanctions have been extended for another half year and their mitigation or cancellation is tied to the execution of the Minsk agreements. At the same time, there is yet another factor that will influence the decision of the EU half a year from now, though it has not been officially declared. It is the reform factor. In the event of the absence of the corresponding changes, particularly in the fight against corruption, the arguments of the advocates in the EU will sound considerably less convincing. Accordingly, foreseeing the position of those who are more inclined towards the softening of sanctions imposed on countries is at the moment quite complicated.
The Minsk agreements became an integral part of discourse in the EU regarding the conflict.
The EU is not prepared to change the format of negotiations (from the Normandy format to any other format that, for example, may be expanded by the U.S.). Similarly, the “proposal package” according to Minsk-2 remains the basis for seeking a compromise and putting an end to the conflict. Clearly, at the moment the EU has ended up in a certain political quagmire. Namely, there is no real progress in the implementation of Minsk-2 and the military escalation of the situation is once again igniting. At the same time, EU member countries are still not ready to apply any new mechanisms of pressure on Russia.
This means that a stake is being placed on prolonging the current situation, though there are certain risks that Ukraine’s European partners should take into account. Fulfillment of half of the agreements is not grounds for a realistic and rational resolution to the conflict. The debate on political points – holding of elections on the territories not controlled by Ukraine – remains totally irrational until the military regulation of the situation is accomplished in full, there is no “regime of silence” in reality and conditions have not been created that would make the holding of elections possible. These conditions are, first and foremost, the standards of electoral process according to the OSCE. The requirement of the consensus of Ukraine to organize the elections in conditions when not a single one of these standards can be executed will not only lead to regulation of the situation, but will be a loss to all stakeholders in the strategic perspective. Given this, while the conflict will be internalized and all outside players will retreat from its diplomatic regulation, this in no way will resolve the problem and will not deprive Russia of the possibility of putting pressure on Ukraine by playing the role of “a master of puppets”.
As such, one of the tasks of Ukraine is to insist on the impossibility of the unilateral realization of the agreements and turn a blind eye to the absence of grounds for the political phase of regulating the conflict. In this situation the European Union must make a choice to the benefit of a long-term decision and place a stake not on the removal of this issue from the daily agenda, rather on its realistic solution. In practice, this will mean that it should not put pressure on the Ukrainian side by demanding it to de facto act contrary to international democratic standards of electoral processes.
In short, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict became a litmus test not only for Ukraine, but also for the joint foreign policy of the European Union, which to this day remains the most sensitive sphere in the mutual activity of its member countries. And although the support of Ukraine by the EU is grounded on defending the norms of international rights, the internal processes in Ukraine and its own position regarding Russia and the conflict will have greater significance as time goes on.
Conclusions
In light of all these internal and external obstacles and circumstances, the year 2015 was most successful in terms of the bilateral harmonization of Ukraine and the EU, pragmatic realization of steps in the sphere of Euro-integration (first of all foremost, the daily agenda and the visa liberalization plan) and the unprecedented support of the process of reform in Ukraine on the part of the EU. Basically, Ukraine has already started to become a part of the joint European space, though without formal official membership perspective. The pressure on Russia, the political moderation of the negotiating process on the part of Germany and France, the trilateral consultations on DCFTA, the positive conclusion of the European Commission regarding the visa-free success of Ukraine, the start of implementation of the Association Agreement and the renewal of the European Neighborhood Policy together form the foundation for a broad spectrum of ties between Ukraine and the EU, which regardless of such details and problems makes their political relations more intensive than ever before. It is precisely this that gives grounds speak of a qualitatively new level of European integration and engaging the EU in the processes of reforms and changes in Ukraine. At the same time, it gives impetus to Ukraine to form a daily agenda for the European Union.
“Focus оn Ukraine” – weekly informational-analytical news bulletin prepared by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation (http://dif.org.ua).
DIF Analysts:
Iryna Bekeshkina
Oleksiy Haran
Ruslan Kermach
Oleksiy Sydorchuk
Maria Zolkina
Editor-in-chief: Iryna Filipchuk
