Populist Orientations of the Ukrainians in the Course of Social Transformations

Oleksandr Reznik,
PhD in Sociology, Head of the Social and Political Processes Department at the Institute of Sociology at the NAS of Ukraine, Head of the Center for Political Sociology

Populist orientations in a strict academic understanding are usually considered as citizens' support of a set of ideas about the existence of antagonism between two homogeneous groups - "virtuous people" and "corrupt ruling elite". Therefore, the desired political system should be an expression of the will of "the people", which is the ultimate source of legitimacy. However, in a broader sense, this can also include various elements of a simplified representation of political life, disbelief in democratic representative procedures, disregard for the opposition (if populists are already in power), a tendency to direct rule and authoritarianism, xenophobia, conspiracy theories, controversial attitudes towards various aspects of economic life, etc. Populist orientations are fueled by people's hope that where established parties and elites have failed, they should rely on simple and "uncorrupted" politicians from "the people." As a result, the demand for "new faces" in politics is spreading, as the functioning of the political system within the framework set by the ruling elite looks extremely corrupt and inefficient. In contrast to the pluralistic concept of democracy, populism affirms plebiscitary politics and personalization of power. This diversity of populism's features has given grounds to call this phenomenon a "thin" ideology. This refers to the lack of a thorough, consistent, and exhaustive explanation of the social world that is offered by "thick" ideologies (communism, liberalism, etc.). That is why populism is always combined with ideologies that are relevant in a particular setting at the time. That is why, when it comes to a certain type of populism, one can sometimes distinguish between right-wing and left-wing populism. However, in general, the rhetoric of populists mimics the changes in the current challenges in a particular society.

In Western countries with established democracies, populism is driven by certain segments of the population feeling disenfranchised by socioeconomic and cultural stratification and sensitive to narratives of betrayal by the current elites. The excessive emphasis by populist politicians on perceived threats to cultural identity from migrants creates a particularly fertile ground for populist orientations. In transitional democracies, populists appeal to economic discontent caused by protracted market reforms, and they also inflame grievances of national pride by speculating on religious or ethnic differences. It is precisely this fluid nature of populism, its ability to articulate a variety of demands ranging from xenophobia to redistribution of property, that makes populist narratives so attractive and persuasive to many supporters. However, it also poses a number of threats and risks to the democratic development of societies. In young democracies with too many challenges, these vulnerabilities are much bigger. Moreover, these risks increase when populists are already in power.

Given how important the institution of elections is to the legitimacy of modern democracies, populist politicians often call the future outcome of elections into question when they see unsatisfactory estimates from pre-election polls. However, in addition to this populist trick, populists benefit from the general public's distrust of the institution of elections. This is especially true in countries where the principles of the electoral system are frequently changed or where the current government abuses the vote count. In any case, the presence of such sentiments may indicate a deep-rooted alienation from state institutions and the political system.

Therefore, this persistent public distrust of their own political efficacy further turned into almost a total antagonism to the ruling class. After all, populist orientations are associated with the tendency of people to look at the world in terms of black and white, in this case with a clear division between "us" (ordinary people) and "them" (elites). This often predisposes people to simplistic interpretations of complex issues and a lack of doubth in their beliefs, which can lead to ambiguity when confronted with conflicting evidence or opinions.

In their attempts to empirically operationalize populist orientations, scholars identify such components as people-centeredness, anti-elitism, the idea of popular sovereignty, anti-pluralism, and the Manichean mindset (Stanley, 2008; Akkerman et al., 2014; Spruyt et al., 2016].

1. People-centeredness. This refers to the undeniable political will of the ordinary people who are inherently wise and virtuous, unlike the treacherous elite. Thus, the political differences between the ruling elite and the people are imagined to be much greater than the differences between ordinary people in general. In other words, it is a belief in thehomogeneity of "the ordinary people".

2. The idea of popular sovereignty implies that politics should be an expression of the will of ordinary people, regardless of their competence. Such people want to be represented by ordinary citizens, not by experts or professional politicians, because they believe that elite representatives are arrogant and do not know how "ordinary people really live."

3. Manichean mindset. This is the tendency to think in terms of the dualism of Good and Evil. It is embodied in an uncompromising anti-elitarian interpretation of the structure of the political world. In our case, it is the perception of the relationship between the "people" and the "elite" as antagonistic.

4. Anti-pluralism. This refers to a skeptical attitude towards the key features of representative democracy, such as compromise, mediating institutions and procedures that ensure the rights of minorities. In contrast to the pluralistic concept of democracy, populism affirms plebiscitary politics and the personalization of power.

Thus, populist orientations (attitudes) can be defined as a set of beliefs about political representation that reflect protest social mobilization for social change. These beliefs structure the political space, dividing it between an imaginary homogeneous bloc of "ordinary people" and the established elite.

After Ukraine declared its independence, there were outbursts of populist sentiment among the population. Such outbursts were caused by the crisis of civic attitudes resulting from social transformations and the inability of the political establishment to respond effectively to the difficulties of economic and political reforms. Anti-elitist sentiments were caused by the fact that after the collapse of the Soviet system, personnel changes among the political leadership at all levels were decorative. All this was certainly reflected in the mass public discourse. For example, in a representative all-Ukrainian survey conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine in December 1996 (N=1200), when asked the question "Has the ruling elite in Ukraine changed since independence?", only 8% said that it had changed completely, another 40% said that the ruling elite had changed partially, and 34% believed that the ruling elite remained the same as before independence. The vast majority of Ukrainians at that time already felt alienated from the ruling class. In particular, 68% of respondents strongly agreed with the statement that those who gained power no longer care about other people and only care about themselves, and another 22.5% rather agreed with this statement. Only 3.5% disagreed with this statement (Shulga et al., 1998).

Over time, negative emotions toward the ruling elite intensified among those who were oriented toward the restoration of the USSR and the command economy. First of all, they were used by the left-wing forces, which accused the elite of stealing property during the large-scale privatization. However, when it came to the democratic transition in 2004, populist rhetoric was widely used by both pro-government and opposition candidates during the election campaign.

That is, populist discourse unwittingly becomes useful for democratic transformation in the context of a radical breakdown of the authoritarian regime. Populist slogans are useful for expanding the social base of a democratic revolution, as they help to turn even indifferent individuals to activists. However, the effectiveness of populist slogans in attracting the masses to protest actions later became an obstacle to the implementation of radical reforms in Ukraine. In fact, the mass consciousness, fueled mostly by left-wing, anti-market ideas about the functioning of the economy and anti-elitist ideas about total lustration of not only the criminal elite of the political class, but also the bureaucracy, often played a destructive role in the actions of politicians, as they were forced to take into account public opinion. In particular, in the immediate aftermath of the Orange Revolution, democratization and the growth of social optimism were accompanied by negative changes. Against the background of a slight improvement in the assessment of the economic situation and growing public confidence in the services of state-owned banks, anti-market sentiments and negative attitudes toward the privatization of land, small and, especially, large enterprises have significantly increased. The number of people who wanted to start their own business and those who were ready to work for an entrepreneur decreased significantly (Panina, 2005, p. 154). The fact is that the political campaign of the presidential candidate Viktor Yushchenko was also based on populist slogans ("Prisons for bandits!"), which legitimately questioned the results of privatization and the illegal enrichment of people close to Leonid Kuchma. However, this also contributed to the delegitimization of the newly emerging private property institution. In fact, this later played a cruel joke on President Yushchenko's reform efforts when his pro-market initiatives failed to find approval among the "people."

Moreover, negative attitudes toward the political elite were deepened by the excessive political subjectivity of the class of large owners, who managed to take control of all branches of state power due to the corrupt nature of the privatization of state property. The oligarchization of political power became so obvious that for several years after the Revolution of Dignity, according to polls conducted by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation, the main causes of the socio-economic crisis were "corruption of the authorities and embezzlement of public funds by the authorities" (in 2015 - 72.1% of respondents; in 2016 - 66.7% of respondents), "oligarchization of the economy, misappropriation of profits by oligarchs and export of funds abroad" (in 2015 - 54.4% of respondents; in 2016 - 58.1% of respondents) and "incompetent management of the economy and social sphere by the highest authorities" (in 2015 - 47.4% of respondents; in 2016 - 46.1% of respondents) (Democratic Initiatives Foundation, 2016). That is, in public opinion, anti-elitist orientations were combined with critical views of the oligarchy.

Ironically, Ukrainian populist forces were funded mainly by oligarchs and at the same time exploited the popular anti-establishment rhetoric against the "corrupt" government and oligarchs. In addition, if we take the activities of populist political actors in Ukraine, then, according to T. Kuzio, they were distinguished in their rhetoric by their tendency to use lies in assessing political reality, justifying authoritarianism and paternalism, and nostalgia for the Soviet Union. At the same time, populists in Ukraine and Europe are similar, speaking with anti-globalization and authoritarian slogans, directing their criticism at the IMF, using radical rhetoric against corrupt elites and the "liberal establishment." Populists provide little support for reforms that they believe are unfairly imposed by outside forces. Populists in Ukraine, Europe, and the United States tend to use untruth, exaggeration, and manipulation, and are ideological chameleons. Finally, populists use crises to mobilize voters (Kuzio, 2018).

The challenging period of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in Donbas, the economic impoverishment of the population, and sensitive reforms in 2014-2019 created a populist public demand. Against this backdrop, low trust in government institutions and the establishment was observed, as well as a growing negative balance of trust in high-profile politicians. At the same time, it turned out that the high public demand for an alternative policy was not satisfied by an active civil society, which could not compete with powerful oligarch-controlled TV channels at that time (Haran, Burkovskiy, 2019).

However, the question is why did all these underlying causes of populism, which have been in place for a long time, manifest themselves in 2018-2019 and not earlier? The fact is that in Ukrainian society, there are various social groups that have partially conflicting political, cultural, and economic interests, and they have very specific demands on the government. For some social groups, the attitude to the state authorities is determined by a rational assessment of their activities, namely in solving various social problems. For others, ideological engagement is decisive. In this sense, we are also talking about social divisions and distinctions, such as preferences in ethno-cultural policy, geopolitical orientations, etc. In fact, ideological, ethnocultural, or geopolitical bias became the key factor influencing the attitude to "friends" and "foes" in the government (Reznik, Kozlovskyi, 2021)

Before the Revolution of Dignity, there was a balance between pro-Western and pro-Russian forces. The polarization of society in its attitude to the current government was based on historical memory, ideology, ethno-cultural identity, and geopolitical orientation. Therefore, although voters had a negative attitude toward representatives of the ruling class, they still tended to support an "old" politician, but a "trusted one," that is, one who would really defend a certain path of Ukraine's development. Instead, after Euromaidan, the geopolitical views of the population began to gravitate toward European integration, and support for Ukraine's accession to NATO even increased. The society became more determined not only in the question about the direction of foreign policy, but also in matters of national identity, language policy, historical memory, etc. At the same time, it should be noted that over the years, support for European integration has fluctuated at more than half of the population, while support for the country's accession to the North Atlantic Alliance has been around 45% (Democratic Initiatives Foundation, 2018). After the Russian aggression in 2014, a part of the population that had previously rejected Euro-Atlantic integration and leaned toward pro-Russian orientations could no longer articulate themselves as supporters of integration with the aggressor country, so they were forced to define themselves outside the dichotomous scale of "pro-European direction - pro-Russian direction." Thus, the idea of a policy of non-alignment with any union (about a quarter of the population) and non-aligned status in the security sphere (about a third of the population) became more popular (Democratic Initiatives Foundation, 2018). The demise of a clear polarization of society by geopolitical orientation has made it meaningless for a large part of the population to take up the eschatological calls of political forces representing the traditional establishment and support them in the elections. In other words, the factor that "prevented" populist orientations from fully "opening up" through their implementation in electoral behavior has disappeared.

K. Ash and M. Shapovalov point out that anti-polarization populist rhetoric is the key to the success of V. Zelenskyy and the Servant of the People party in 2019 elections. This is because, given the existence of strong polarizing brands with tangible public support, populists are forced to join one of them, as D. Trump did in the United States. However, when party brands are weak, populists can play their own game. The presence of a sufficient number of voters who do not share strong opinions, are indifferent or have an ambivalent perception of the issues on which the main political forces are polarized are factors that can lead to the victory of anti-systemic populists with anti-polarization rhetoric. That is why Zelenskyy and the Servant of the People competed with a political establishment that has been polarized since Ukraine's independence and remained polarized after Euromaidan. As the empirical study reveals, voters of the Servant of the People in the 2019 parliamentary elections in Ukraine were more likely to hold ambivalent positions on the EU association, perception of the 2014 Revolution, and language policy. They tended to use Russian and Ukrainian in a balanced way in their daily lives. In other words, the Servant of the People voters were mostly dissatisfied with the established Ukrainian political system and preferred a new perspective, while not having strong feelings about the EU association or language issues that dominated political discourse until 2019 (Ash, Shapovalov, 2022). Thus, the long-standing populist orientations among Ukrainian society became crucial at a time when the issues of identity or the country's foreign policy orientation ceased to polarize society. Moreover, it was the sharp contrast between "ordinary people" and "old politicians" in the election rhetoric of V. Zelenskyy's team that was supported in most regions of Ukraine, among people with different levels of education, qualifications, living in different types of settlements.

In other words, against the backdrop of eliminating the traditional issues that polarized society (orange versus white and blue, pro-European versus pro-Russian, etc.), Zelenskyy's team managed to impose a political discourse of populist polarization on a large part of society - new, out-of-system politicians who represented the problems and grievances of ordinary people versus the old, corrupt elite from all political camps. It was under such conditions that the existing sentiment in society against the establishment was able to be translated into voting for a political party or candidate who was perceived as outsider or anti-systemic. A well-designed populist campaign managed to create a sense of "us versus them" and portray political opponents as corrupt, incompetent, or elitist.

However, after the 2019 election cycle, the newly formed polarization between supporters of the previous and current presidents of the country persisted for a long time in Ukrainian society, especially among citizens interested in politics. It should be understood that mass populist sentiment brought to power politicians who sought to be admired and implement projects that were considered to be of top priority by the majority (the Big Construction Project, etc.). And the fact that a minority of voters supported a candidate with the slogans "Army. Language. Faith" showed that society was not ready to face the urgent challenges which, if not taken into account, would later result in a too high price.

Just as after both Maidans and after Zelenskyy's presidential election, inexperienced politicians came to power using populist slogans, and it was their amateurism that became a valuable social capital which supposedly distinguished them from traditional, "compromised" elites. However, the normal functioning of any sphere, including the political sphere, requires the knowledge and skills of executives. Politicians and officials are people who should ideally govern professionally and effectively. Therefore, training personnel for public administration is a complex, time-consuming, and costly process. Instead, populists' calls to accelerate changes in a certain direction by inviting "uncorrupted" and "people outside the system" are extremely risky for unstable societies with numerous challenges. After all, the constant reform of the state apparatus makes state institutions vulnerable, erasing the "institutional memory" of the bureaucratic layer.

It is noteworthy that even after the new President Zelenskyy's team, which represented a new, "untainted" elite, came to power, the vast majority of citizens continued to profess a Manichean mindset, embodied in an uncompromising interpretation of the structure of the political world in terms of anti-elitism. For example, a national representative survey (N=2035) conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology at the request of the School for Policy Analysis of the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in September 2019 used a scientific methodology to study populist orientations (NaUKMA School for Policy Analysis, 2019). In particular, this study examined public attitudes toward the ideas of the "infallibility of the people" whose interests should be represented by untainted new politicians; the elite-people antithesis; a tendency to direct governance and simple solutions outside of representative procedures; a trend toward ignoring the media, etc. (table 1).

Table 1

Attitude of the Ukrainian citizens to populist statements, September 2019, %

Source: NaUKMA School for Policy Analysis, 2019

The overwhelming majority of Ukrainians simultaneously agreed with most populist statements and two anti-populist statements ("if the implementation of a popularly adopted decision threatens the constitutional rights of certain groups or minorities, the state authorities should stand up for these minorities" and "people in a referendum can make a wrong decision"). In other words, there was a contradictory phenomenon when the majority of the population agreed with the popular dictates of the majority and at the same time did not want to take responsibility for wrong decisions or oppression of minorities.

A year later, in September 2020, the NaUKMA School of Political Analysis, in cooperation with Info Sapiens, conducted a similar nationwide survey (N=2000) with the reproduction of certain populist marker statements compared to the previous year. It turned out that Ukrainians have significantly decreased their agreement that socially important laws should be adopted immediately, even if necessary, in violation of the procedure. Compared to 53% of respondents who agreed with this in 2019, only 29% supported this idea after a year of the new government's rule (NaUKMA School for Policy Analysis, 2020). That is, society has experienced some degree of disappointment in certain populist slogans and means of achieving the goal. At the same time, the answers to other questions marking populism remained unchanged. In particular, the proposal that "the parliament has no right to pass laws that contradict public opinion" was still supported by the vast majority of the population, albeit to a lesser extent: 63.2% overall agreed with this statement (compared to 83.8% in 2019). Moreover, more respondents agreed that people in the referendum could make a wrong decision (essentially anti-populist statement): in 2020, 45% agreed and 20.6% disagreed, while in 2019, the respective figures were 63% and 17.5% (NaUKMA School for Policy Analysis, 2020).

Thus, after a year of populist rule, some aspects of populism began to lose popular support, while other aspects continued to strengthen in public opinion. At the same time, certain changes in the mass consciousness did occur. Even before the Euromaidan, the Razumkov Center's survey recorded a significant public demand for new political leaders (Table 2). At the same time, a significant proportion of the population believed that the existing ones were satisfactory. Despite the developments after the Revolution of Dignity, the need for new political leaders has increased to its highest level: in a 2015 Razumkov Center survey, 55% of Ukrainians indicated such a need, while only 28% believed that the existing political leaders were satisfactory. However, in 2020, after a year of the new government's tenure, the gap between these shares narrowed significantly. And during the year of full-scale war, these shares became equal. Here, we can assume that this is either a consequence of a certain disappointment in the new leaders, or the new government team fully satisfies this need.

Table 2

Dynamics of Ukrainians' answers to the question "Do you think Ukraine needs new political leaders?", %

Source: (Razumkov Center, 2022)

Instead, the demand for new political parties is manifested only among about a third of the population (Table 3). Thus, the share of citizens who believed that Ukraine needed new political parties in 2022 remained virtually unchanged compared to 2020. That is, both before and during the full-scale war, about half of the population believed that the existing political forces were satisfactory.

Таблиця 3

Dynamics of Ukrainians' answers to the question "Do you think Ukraine needs new political parties?", %

Джерело: (Razumkov Center, 2022)

Thus, we can cautiously conclude that populist demands peaked in late 2010, and despite the strong support for the main populist slogans, the martial law and the corresponding decline in political competition did not contribute to the reproduction of anti-elite sentiment. In addition, the rapid growth of trust in most state institutions and national unity of society during the full-scale war temporarily offset the antagonism between the ruling elite and the people.

Therefore, it would be reasonable to assume that in the context of a large-scale war, support for populist ideas decreases. To test this hypothesis, we used the methodology of measuring populist orientations within the framework of the all-Ukrainian survey "Socio-Political Attitudes of the Population of Ukraine", which was conducted by KIIS at the request of Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation in July 2023 conducted with a method of personal interviews using a tablet. A total of 2011 interviews were conducted with respondents living in 135 settlements of Ukraine. The sample was stratified, three-stage, random with quota selection at the last stage. The stratification and quota assignment were based on the aggregated arrays of KIIS Omnibus surveys conducted between September 2022 and February 2023. Respondents were asked to agree or disagree with a number of statements that reflect the main populist ideas (Table 4).

Table 4

Answers of the Ukrainians' to the question "Now I will read out different statements to you, and you tell me how much you agree or disagree with each of them." July 2023, %

The study showed that most Ukrainians agree with populist ideas of people-centeredness. For example, 69.6% of respondents agreed with the statement "people are much wiser than politicians, so politicians should follow only the will of the people," while only 17.1% disagreed. Similarly, the majority of the Ukrainian population (60.9%) agreed that "the opinion of ordinary people is often more important than the opinion of professional politicians and experts" and only one-fifth of respondents (21%) disagreed.

However, the attitude of Ukrainians toward anti-elitist ideas revealed certain contradictions. Some anti-elitist ideas found almost absolute support among the population. For example, 72.5% of respondents agreed with the statement "people who have been in politics for a long time cannot be honest and principled", while only 15.2% disagreed. A similar level of support was recorded for the statement "our country should be governed by representatives of the people, not by representatives of the ruling elite" - 69.5%, and only 12.3% disagreed. However, opinions were divided on the statement "I would like to be represented in politics by an ordinary citizen, not an experienced politician," which is similar to the previous idea conceptually but worded differently: 38.8% of respondents supported and 37.1% disagreed. Moreover, almost a quarter (24%) of respondents could not decide on this issue. This contradiction can be explained by the fact that the dichotomy "representatives of the people - representatives of the ruling elite" emphasizes the abstract anti-elite antagonism, the choice among which does not oblige a post-communist person to anything, while when it comes to their own representation in politics, people are more rational in their choice between "ordinary citizen" and "experienced politician."

Such manifestation of populism as Manichean noncompromising interpretation of politics is less evident in Ukrainian society. Although almost half of the population (49%) agreed with the statement "compromise in politics is actually a trade of one's own principles" and only 21% disagreed, a significant share of the population (30%) was undecided on this issue. On the other hand, the populist statement "in politics, the result is more important, even if it is obtained in violation of the law" did not find support: only a quarter (25.5%) of the population supported it, while more than half (56.3%) of Ukrainians disagreed with it. Obviously, as in the polls initiated by the NaUKMA School for Policy Analysis in 2019-2020, the moral aspect of violating the legal procedure does not arouse enthusiasm, even though it is necessary to achieve results.

To determine the socio-demographic predictors of populist orientations, a linear regression was used. The average total index of populist orientations was used as the dependent variable. When calculating this index, the code positions of the scale for each of the seven indicators (in the order of the answer options) were assigned a value from 1 point (low level of support for populism) to 5 points (high level of support for populism). The sum of the scores of all seven indicators is averaged by dividing by 7. Therefore, the values of the averaged total index can vary from 1 to 5. Thus, according to the results of 2023, the index of populist orientations was equal to 3.47, which means an increased level of support for populism in society.

The following factors were identified as independent variables:

1) gender, measured on a dichotomous scale (1 = men; 2 = women);

2) age measured in years;

3) level of education measured on an 8-point scale (1 = primary (less than 7 grades); 2 = incomplete secondary (less than 10 grades); 3 = profession-oriented education after 7-8 grades; 4 = complete secondary education (10-11 grades); 5 = profession-oriented education after 10-11 grades; 6 = secondary specialized education (college, etc.); 7 = incomplete higher education; 8 = complete higher education);

4) assessment of the family's financial situation, measured on a 5-point scale (1 = "we do not have enough money even for food"; 2 = "we have enough money for food, but buying clothes is already challenging"; 3 = "we have enough money for food, clothes and we can save some money, but it is not enough to buy pricey things (such as a refrigerator or TV)"; 4 = "we can afford to buy some pricey things (such as a TV or refrigerator)"; 5 = "we can afford to buy anything we want");

5) type of settlement, measured on a 7-point scale (1 = village; 2 = urban-type settlement; 3 = city of up to 20 thousand; 4 = city of 20-49 thousand; 5 = city of 50-99 thousand; 6 = city of 100-499 thousand; 7 = city of 500 thousand and more);

6) macro-regional division measured on a dichotomous scale (West/Center = 1; South/East = 0);

7) the language of communication in the family, measured by three separate dichotomous indicators: Ukrainian (1/0), Russian (1/0), Ukrainian and Russian (1/0).

Table 5 presents the standardized β-coefficients of the regression analysis for the populist orientation index. Thus, only age, level of education, assessment of family financial situation, and type of settlement provide statistically significant (marked with asterisks * in the table) associations with the index of populist orientations in the expected direction. In particular, the tendency to populist interpretations of political life increases with increasing age, decreasing size of the settlement, decreasing level of education, and decreasing level of family financial situation.

Table 5

Determinants of populist orientations of Ukrainians, multiple linear regression (2023)

Notes. Entries in the table are standardized β-coefficients (beta) with t-statistics in parentheses.
Statistical significance of the coefficients: * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001.

Standardized coefficients allow us to assess the relative strength of the relationship between independent and dependent variables. If these factors are ranked by the standardized coefficient (beta), they can be ranked as follows: level of education (-0.139), age (0.117), family financial situation (-0.104), and type of settlement (-0.055). However, it is obvious that it is incorrect to talk about a clear advantage of a certain type of determinants in this case. It is noteworthy that the results of the regression analysis showed no influence of such determinants as gender, macro-regional division and the language spoken in the family.

Thus, in Ukraine, the ongoing social transformations of the post-communist period have led to total distrust and negative attitudes toward state institutions. Due to the irreplaceability of the political establishment, persistent anti-elitist sentiments have been formed in the mass consciousness. However, the existence of polarization in Ukrainian society by geopolitical orientations and social identities has long led citizens to rely on traditional political forces in their electoral behavior. For decades, the political preferences of the population have been based on the division of politicians depending on geopolitical orientations and ethno-cultural preferences. This prevented populists from fully emerging as a real anti-establishment force. Only after this polarization weakened considerably did populist orientations become an electoral phenomenon in 2019, when non-systemic politicians came to power. During the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war, a radical reassessment of the state and state institutions took place, so the antagonism between the population and the elite became temporarily irrelevant. However, the high level of support for populist ideas among Ukrainians, even in times of war, carries risks in the postwar restoration of competitive political life, when the existing political establishment will be considered "traditional" and "corrupt."

A positive development is that certain populist ideas no longer attract Ukrainians. In particular, to achieve results, the majority of the population no longer approves of violating the law, such as the public support for President Zelenskyy's dissolution of the parliament in 2019. This is due to the fact that in response to the Russian aggression, the largest decline in the cynicism index was recorded as a measure of disdain for generally accepted values which indirectly reflects the legitimacy of the social order (Reznik, 2023). That is why the Presidential Office's initiatives to hold regular parliamentary elections during the war were not supported by the public (Vedernikova, 2023).

Moreover, it is important to note that despite the high support for populism in society, it is not determined by regional or ethno-linguistic differences. Thus, the phenomenon of populism as a potential problem for the democratization of society will not be reinforced by social cleavages of this kind. As in developed democracies, support for populism in Ukraine is concentrated primarily among the population groups that are the most economically disadvantaged in the context of globalization and digitalization, i.e., people living in small towns, less educated, older, and with financial problems.

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